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Abstract 
 
Dissatisfied with centralized approaches to delivering local public services, a large 
number of countries are decentralizing responsibility for these services to lower-level, 
locally elected governments. The results have been mixed. This chapter provides a 
framework for evaluating the benefits and costs, in terms of service delivery, of different 
approaches to decentralization, based on relationships of accountability between different 
actors in the delivery chain. Moving from a model of central provision to that of 
decentralization to local governments introduces a new relationship of accountability—
between national and local policymakers—while altering existing relationships, such as 
that between citizens and elected politicians. Only by examining how these relationships 
change can we understand why decentralization can, and sometimes cannot, lead to better 
service delivery. In particular, the various instruments of decentralization—fiscal, 
administrative, regulatory, market, and financial—can affect the incentives facing service 
providers, even though they relate only to local policymakers. Likewise, and perhaps 
more significantly, the incentives facing local and national politicians can have a 
profound effect on the provision of local services. Finally, the process of implementing 
decentralization can be as important as the design of the system in influencing service 
delivery outcomes.   1 
1.  Introduction 
In the last quarter century, over 75 countries have attempted to transfer 
responsibilities of the state to lower tiers of government. Significantly, most of these 
lower-tier governments have been elected, so that the decentralization is not just 
administrative or fiscal, but also political. The motivation for the decentralization has 
varied. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, it was part of the political and 
economic transformation; in Latin America, it was to reinforce the transition to 
democracy; in South Africa, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, it was a response to ethnic or 
regional conflict; and in Chile, Uganda and Cote d’Ivoire, it was to improve the delivery 
of basic services (Shah and Thompson 2004). Even when it is not explicit, improving 
service delivery is an implicit motivation behind most of these decentralization efforts.  
The reasons are twofold. First, these basic services, such as health, education, 
water and sanitation, all of which are the responsibility of the state, are systematically 
failing—and especially failing poor people (World Bank 2003). That governments are 
falling short of their responsibility to ensure adequate health, education, water and 
sanitation to their people can be seen at various levels. At the macroeconomic level, the 
main instrument with which governments exercise this responsibility—public spending—
seems to have only a weak relationship with outcomes. Public spending on health has no 
significant association with reductions in child or infant mortality; and public spending 
on education has an extremely weak relationship with primary school completion rates 
(Filmer and Pritchett 1999a, 1999b; Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett 2000).  
A look at the microeconomic evidence indicates why government spending does 
not translate to better outcomes. For one thing, the money does not often reach the 
frontline service provider. In Uganda, the share of nonsalary spending on primary 
education that actually reached primary schools was 13 percent (Reinikka and Svensson 
2001). For another, the quality of these services is often extremely poor. In Bangladesh, 
the absenteeism rate for doctors in primary health centers was 74 percent (Chaudhury and 
Hammer 2003).  
The second reason why improving service delivery is behind most 
decentralization efforts is that these services are consumed locally. Historically, they 
were also provided locally. Norway’s health system was run by locally-appointed health 
commissions until the 1930s; schools in Nepal were managed by communities until the 
1960s. Yet today the central government in these two countries (as well as most others) 
assumes responsibility for the delivery of these services. Many governments and their 
electorates associate the problems of service delivery with the centralization of these 
services. 
For instance, the fact that only a fraction of the money that is due service 
providers actually reaches them may be due to the power of the central government vis-à-
vis local government, through whom the money gets transferred. Similarly, centralization 
means that the allocation of resources among these local services may not reflect local 
preferences. Faguet (2001) shows that decentralization in Bolivia led to a better match 
between local preferences and budgetary allocations. Faguet’s study points to another 
problem of centralization: some regions might get completely neglected. Prior to   2 
decentralization in Bolivia, an overwhelmingly disproportionate amount of public 
resources were concentrated in the capital city and its surroundings. Finally, central-
government provision could also lead to greater corruption and misuse of funds, as the 
service recipients in a local district cannot monitor the bureaucrat or politician in the 
capital city (Bardhan and Mukherjee 2000). 
However, despite these problems associated with central delivery of services, the 
experience with decentralization has been quite mixed (World Bank 2003; Burki, Perry, 
and Dillinger 1999). While success or failure is difficult (and premature) to judge, some 
common problems associated with decentralization’s impact on service delivery have 
begun to emerge. 
The most frequently-cited problem is the lack of capacity at sub-national levels of 
government to exercise responsibility for public services. In Uganda and Tanzania, the 
lower tiers of government lacked the ability to manage public finances and maintain 
proper accounting procedures. Since these were a requirement for transferring money to 
the lower tiers, they actually received less money than before decentralization. In 
Uganda, spending on primary health care fell from 33 percent to 16 percent during 
decentralization (Akin, Hutchinson, and Strump 2001). In Ethiopia, where 
decentralization goes down to the third tier or woreda level, some woredas lack enough 
people who can read and write to operate the district governments (Swaroop?).  
A second problem is that decentralization has led to misaligned responsibilities, 
possibly because the process is incomplete, possibly for political reasons. Although 
Pakistan has devolved responsibility for education to the districts, school teachers remain 
employees of the provincial government. The district nazim or elected executive has little 
authority over the hiring, firing, evaluation, or placement of teachers.  
Third, while decentralization was in some cases intended to strengthen the 
political power of lower tiers of government vis-à-vis the center, it has also increased the 
possibility of political capture within these lower tiers. In 1979, Indonesia established 
“village governments” with locally-chosen village heads accountable to village councils 
that would determine budget priorities. A study of 48 rural villages showed that, since 
village heads chose the members of the council, accountability to the villagers was weak; 
only 3 percent of the village proposals were included in the district budgets. Those 
villagers who participated in government organizations were more likely to speak out at 
village council meetings, crowding out the voice of others in the village (World Bank 
2001). 
Fourth, a host of other problems, not associated with service delivery, have 
nevertheless helped to undermine service delivery in decentralizing economies. For 
instance, the “soft-budget constraint” facing sub-national governments has led to over-
borrowing (Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2003) and, in the case of Argentina, a major 
macroeconomic crisis at the end of 2001. The social impact of the Argentinian crisis has 
clearly been a deterioration in service quality: poverty rates jumped 40 percent, 12 
percent of the people with formal health insurance discontinued their policies, medical 
supplies were in short supply throughout the public hospital network and in 2002 a third 
of the provinces experienced school closings of 20-80 days out of a 180-day school year 
(World Bank 2003).   3 
This paper provides a framework that explains both why decentralization can 
generate substantial improvements in service delivery, and why it often falls short of this 
promise. The essence of the framework is that the delivery of services requires strong 
relationships of accountability between the actors in the service delivery chain. In 
contrast to the delivery of goods or services in a private, competitive market, where the 
service provider is directly accountable to the client or consumer of the service, the 
delivery of public services involves at least two relationships of accountability. First, 
clients as citizens have to hold policymakers or politicians accountable for allocating 
resources towards these services. Second, policymakers in turn need to hold the service 
providers accountable for delivering the service. We refer to this as the “long route of 
accountability,” as opposed to the “short route” which is the direct accountability of 
providers to clients (Figure 1). 
 
Weaknesses in service-delivery outcomes can be attributed to a breakdown in one 
or both of the links along the long route of accountability. For instance, the fact that 
public spending on health and education mainly benefits the non-poor reflects the 
inability of citizens, especially poor citizens, to hold politicians accountable for resource 
allocation decisions. In some cases, this is because there is no electoral democracy in the 
country. In others, there may be a functioning electoral system, but due to information 
asymmetries or social polarization, the outcomes may still be biased against the poor 
(Keefer and Khemani 2005). Even if poor citizens can hold politicians accountable, the 
politician in turn may not be able to hold the provider accountable. The Minister of 
Education in the capital city will not be able to monitor school teachers in rural primary 
schools. Unless there is a mechanism by which clients can monitor and discipline the 
providers (that is, the short-route of accountability is working), the result is that teachers 
are absent, and primary education suffers. 
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These problems with the long route of accountability are what lead some to 
advocate decentralization as a means of strengthening accountability and thereby 
improving service delivery. Devolving responsibility for public services to lower tiers of 
government means that the politician who is responsible is now a locally-elected one 
(Figure 2). The hope is that this would make him more accountable to the citizens, as 
they can monitor him more closely and attribute changes in service quality to him more 
easily. That is, decentralization will strengthen the citizen-local politician relationship of 
accountability, and thereby the other relationships of accountability for service delivery.
1 
 
However, as shown in Figure 2, decentralization introduces one more relationship 
of accountability, namely between the central and local policymaker. In fact, much of the 
literature on decentralization focuses on this relationship—the rules and practices 
governing fiscal transfers, regulation and expenditures between central and local 
policymakers. As our earlier discussion pointed out, changes in these rules and practices 
affect service delivery only through their effect on the accountability relationship 
between local policymakers and providers. For instance, as mentioned earlier in the case 
of education in Pakistan, even if devolution leads to fiscal transfers from the central to the 
local policymakers, but the local policymaker cannot hold the provider accountable (since 
he is an employee of the central government), the greater accountability of local 
politicians to their electorate may not result in better service delivery. Section 2 of this 
chapter examines how different types of accountability mechanisms between central and 
local government (fiscal transfers, regulation, borrowing rules, etc.) affect the incentives 
facing service providers, and how these translate to service delivery outcomes. 
                                                 
1 This paper mainly addresses the implications for service delivery of this specific model of 
decentralization—to locally elected governments. However, in Section 4 we take up the issue of other types 
of decentralization that might be preferable for improving service delivery. 
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But even if resources and responsibilities between the central and local 
governments can be effectively decentralized, there remains the question whether locally-
elected governments will have better incentives for service delivery. Section 3 treats this 
question by examining the effect of decentralization on political incentives at all levels—
central and local. It asks how a system where politicians at the central level were not 
facing the right incentives to provide good services will change in the wake of 
decentralization. For instance, if there were information asymmetries, are these reduced 
or exacerbated by decentralization? How are social polarization and elite capture 
affected? And how do electoral rules and political institutions affect the outcome? 
Finally, in section 4, we explore some open questions in the link between 
decentralization and service delivery, most of which have to do with the transition from a 
centralized to a decentralized system. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  The Accountability between Central and Local Policymakers and 
Providers 
Decentralization introduces a new relationship of accountability, that between 
central and local policymaker (figure 3), even as it seeks to make local politicians more 
accountable to their local clients. In addressing the difficulties with the “long route of 
accountability”, decentralization introduces its own complications. This section examines 
how the accountability between central and local policymakers—its fiscal, financing, 
regulatory, and administrative dimensions—can have an important bearing on the 
incentives facing service providers and therefore on service delivery outcomes. Sound 
design and implementation of these aspects of decentralization is the starting point for 
improving local service delivery. 
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2.1  Fiscal issues 
Four components define the fiscal dimensions of decentralization: (i) allocation of 
expenditure responsibilities by central and local tiers of government; (ii) assignment of 
taxes by government tiers; (iii) the design of an intergovernmental grant system; and (iv) 
the budgeting and monitoring of fiscal flows between different government tiers. Local 
governments will be less accountable for delivering good services if they can manipulate 
these components to shift fiscal liabilities to the center—what is often referred to as a 
“soft budget constraint” (Litvack, Ahmad, Bird 1998).  
The assignment of expenditure and financing responsibility between different 
tiers of government can have a direct impact on service delivery. For example, in some 
countries in Latin America, the decentralization of water and sanitation services to small 
local governments have led to a loss of economies of scale in service delivery (ref: 
Foster). On the other hand, recognizing that the spillover benefits of health and education 
outcomes and their impact on equity are national in scope have convinced many 
governments in Latin America and Africa to keep the financing of these sectors at a 
central level (Litvack, Ahmad, Bird 1997)). In the United States, the assignment of 
certain business taxes to local levels have led to inefficient tax competition – a race to the 
bottom – with consequences for the tax base of municipalities and their ability to finance 
service delivery (Inman 1992).  
In principle, the factors that should come into play in deciding the optimal 
assignment of expenditure and tax responsibilities include economies of scale, spillover 
benefits, cost of administering taxes, tax efficiency, and equity. In practice, political 
realities and historical legacies often determine the choices and, not surprisingly, give rise 
to mismatches. Political expediency led the Indonesian parliament to hastily pass laws in 
1999 to implement a “big-bang,” decentralization, but left the expenditure law unclear on 
assignments. The laws have had to subsequently revised (World Bank 2002). 
In addition, the assignment of responsibilities can affect service delivery by 
altering the accountability of lower-level governments to higher-level governments. For 
instance, there is often a concurrence in expenditure and financing responsibilities. This 
issue is well exemplified by the way health and education services are funded and 
delivered in South Africa. Currently, each of these expenditures is constitutionally 
considered to be the concurrent responsibility of central and provincial governments. But 
the concept of concurrence – who is responsible for what aspect of the joint responsibility 
– has not been defined properly. While policy, delivery standards, and health and 
education financing are decided nationally, implementation is decentralized to provinces. 
Not surprisingly, this structure has created incentives for budget gaming. After spending 
their grants, many provinces leave the central government to worry about any funding 
gaps, arguing that central mandates need to be financed directly from the center. A 
system of properly defined concurrent responsibilities might have the center fund 
national standards, leaving the provinces with own resources to manage and if necessary 
pay for service delivery above the national minimum standards. Alternatively, 
responsibilities could be fully centralized with provinces contracted for service delivery 
through effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.  
   7 
Second, the accountability of lower-level governments to local clients is enhanced 
if sub-national governments have access to own-taxes with the right to adjust tax rates.
2 
Indeed, the service delivery incentives facing sub-national governments may improve if, 
at the margin, they have to raise their own revenues through tax increases rather than 
relying on central transfers or bailouts that soften the budget constraint. This potential 
impact of own-taxes suggests that proposals for national tax reforms should include tax 
instruments that can be devolved, or, at the very least, introduce a system of surcharges 
on national taxes.
3 In the United States, the adherence to sales tax as an important source 
of revenue for states is a reflection of the country’s federal origins and a historical 
commitment to ensure the independence of states in economic management (McLure 
1999). South Africa has considered allowing provinces a surtax on national income tax to 
enable them greater autonomy in decision making. India has considered a dual center-
state VAT (with the power given to states to set rates) in order to strengthen inter-
governmental fiscal relations and to enlarge the tax base (Government of India 2004).  
Third, the design and implementation of intergovernmental fiscal transfers can 
influence the accountability of sub-national governments for service delivery. Own-tax 
sources will rarely meet the funding requirements of sub-national governments, nor does 
the theory of fiscal decentralization suggest that each tier of government should be self-
sufficient. Fiscal transfers typically have a conditional and an unconditional portion. The 
former leads to a more hierarchical system of accountability – the center holding the sub-
national accountable for proper use of central transfers. The latter falls in the category of 
discretionary resources for which sub-national governments are directly accountable to 
their constituencies. Also critical is the predictability of fiscal transfers, essential in 
allowing sub-national governments to plan local service delivery more effectively. 
Predictability is enhanced through the use of formula-based allocation systems driven by 
simple measures of equity and efficiency (Bird 2003).  
In general, the use of unconditional, formula, and block transfers enhances both 
the predictability and “own revenue” properties of such fiscal flows. However, transfers 
are also subject to political manipulation by central governments. There is an emerging 
consensus in the literature that resource distribution across sub-national governments 
cannot be explained by efficiency and equity considerations alone, that political variables 
representing the incentives of central political agents are additional and significant 
determinants. Thus, sub-national governments that are politically disadvantaged, in that 
                                                 
2 Even with decentralized tax instruments, administrative costs and efficiently criteria suggest that tax 
administration and setting of tax bases (as opposed to tax rates) can remain a central function. In many 
countries, a national but independent tax administration is an option that is being considered as part of the 
fiscal decentralization process. 
3 This raises several policy issues. For example, if promoting accountability of each tier of government is 
an important policy objective, the general conclusion that the value-added-tax (VAT) is preferable to a 
sales tax may need to be reassessed since the VAT is administratively difficult to devolve. Or, to take 
another example, one would need to reassess whether in a federal system, a combination of central VAT 
and a provincial sales tax is not “superior” to a central VAT and revenue sharing. In the case of a system of 
surcharges, national tax reform may also need to consider the coordination or national and sub-national tax 
rates. 
   8 
there are weak political incentives for central resource transfer towards them, risk having 
poor capacity for service delivery. Recent evidence from India shows that even when 
transfers are supposed to be formula-driven they can be influenced by political concerns 
and constitutional rules delegating decision-making to independent agencies can make a 
difference in curbing political influence (Khemani 2003). Several countries, such as India 
and South Africa, have adopted independent commissions to oversee and protect fiscal 
transfers from the center to the sub-national from political vagaries. But, the performance 
of these commissions have been mixed. In the case of India, many states have not 
implemented state level finance commissions. In South Africa, the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission, while playing an important role in the initial years of the new democracy, 
has progressively lost its influence as the country made its transition from conflict years. 
These examples suggest that the politics that influence the distribution of resources 
between different tiers of governments may inevitably determine the design and 
effectiveness of independent commissions aimed at insulating intergovernmental finances 
from political capture.  
Over-dependence on central transfers can also undermine the accountability of 
sub-national governments to the local electorate, and facilitate shifting of blame for 
breakdowns in service delivery to upper tiers of government (Rodden 2002; Khemani 
2004a). The extent to which the design of intergovernmental transfers affects local 
accountability depends upon the nature of political relations between national and sub-
national governments—if institutions of political competition promote accountability to 
the local electorate, there will be stronger incentives for quality service delivery 
(Khemani 2004b). 
Finally, fiscal interdependence between different tiers of governments means that 
budgeting and evaluation of transfers are also important elements in ensuring efficient 
service delivery and getting value for money. In their budgeting process, a number of 
countries have implemented a medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) that allows 
sub-national entities to participate in a multi-year budgeting system (e.g., South Africa). 
Even if the fiscal transfer system does not have a predictable, formula-driven division of 
total revenues between different tiers of government, the multi-year nature of the MTEF 
can provide some certainty, usually over a three-year span. To complement its MTEF 
process, South Africa has introduced a comprehensive Treasury Bill that focuses on 
financial management within the intergovernmental system, including the regular 
publication of comprehensive financial information for each tier of government to assist 
in the monitoring of public resources. This facilitates public monitoring by non-
governmental civil society groups that can make budget information comprehensible to 
citizens (Singh and Shah 2003). Some countries, such as Brazil, have gone one step 
further by involving communities in the budget process through a participatory approach 
such as in city municipalities in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte (Andrews and Shah 
2003). 
2.2   Financing 
Access to capital markets by sub-national governments is important for several 
reasons. First, long-term financing is necessary given the lumpiness of public 
expenditures for infrastructure services and the inefficiency of relying on pay-as-you-go 
schemes. Without access to long-term finance, investment in infrastructure may be sub-  9 
optimal. Second, infrastructure investments benefit future generations, so equity requires 
that future generations should also bear the cost of financing. Financial markets offer this 
inter-temporal linkage. Third, financial markets play an important role in signaling the 
performance of regional and local governments. The accountability created for sub-
national governments on the fiscal side by providing an own-revenue base can be further 
strengthened by providing access to capital markets on the debt side. In fact, the implicit 
threat that poor policy management and service delivery may force local policymakers to 
raise own-taxes, or pay higher borrowing costs, are important incentives in ensuring that 
service delivery is managed efficiently. 
How sub-national governments access financial markets will determine the extent 
to which such markets will influence the overall health of the subnational government 
and its ability to ensure good service delivery. Generally, access can be achieved through 
the central government (where the central government borrows on behalf of sub-national 
tiers), through a public financial intermediary (e.g., a municipal bank or fund), or by 
raising funds directly (e.g., commercial bank borrowing or bond operation by sub-
national governments). While borrowing through the central government certainly 
guarantees access by sub-national governments to long-term finance, international 
experience suggests that the allocation of credit through this route may get embroiled in 
politics. Capital then does not necessarily flow to the most productive use but follows 
political incentives, with the result that government borrowing is inefficient, the 
subsequent investments are unproductive, and services suffer. Intermediation by a public 
financial intermediary (PFI), may also suffer from these drawbacks, with the additional 
disadvantage that the debt of the PFIs is generally an implicit – hence unplanned -- 
obligation of the central government. In Argentina, for example, public banks provided 
loans to finance the deficits of sub-national governments, contributing to macro economic 
imbalances as well as stifling the incentives for changing inefficient service delivery 
mechanisms (Ahmad 1996).  
Direct access to capital markets offers the potential for a more market-based 
relationship to develop and for a greater chance of enforcing a hard budget constraint. 
But, moral hazard—the presumption by capital markets that borrowing by sub-national 
governments will be backed by the central government—can be a concern for 
decentralized borrowing directly from the market. Resolving this problem is critical for 
ensuring that financial markets provide the appropriate signals to sub-national 
governments in their investment decisions.  
There are several regulatory mechanisms for reducing the moral hazard problem 
of decentralized borrowing. Measurement of the assets and liabilities of each tier of 
government on a regular basis and disclosure of this information is a necessary step. But, 
it is not sufficient. Explicit measures and mechanisms to manage public sector 
bankruptcy are essential to ensuring that both sub-national governments and their 
creditors can be held accountable for their actions without assuming that upper-tier 
governments will play the role of banker of last resort. In New Zealand, the court system 
—given its independence and capacity—intervenes in cases of public sector bankruptcy. 
In the United States, the political process allows the formation of control boards. In both 
cases, local policy makers have to bear the consequences of poor financial decisions, i.e. 
face a hard budget constraint.    10 
An important component of the bankruptcy process is to define a mechanism for 
ensuring the continuity of a minimum level of service delivery. In principle this can be 
done by the courts or the control boards with the legal authority to ring fence local 
resources to maintain local services. This process ensures that the potential spillover 
effects of a city or local government going bankrupt are internalized and local policy 
makers are accountable for their decisions. In addition it ensures that services such as 
water and sanitation and solid waste management, which have important health 
externalities – and can therefore lead to moral hazard – continue to function. 
Other measures include legislating end-of the year balanced budget requirements, 
eliminating the access by local governments to indirect sources of funding such as using 
municipal corporations borrowing on behalf of local governments (Brazil) or delaying 
contribution to pension funds (USA) to finance budgets, or at the very least ensuring that 
such liabilities are measured and officially reported.  
2.3   Administrative Responsibilities and Building Capacity 
Alongside fiscal and financial resources and autonomy, a key issue facing sub-
national governments is the access to staff and human resources. Decentralized service 
delivery is difficult when subnational governments lack skills and institutional capacity. 
More often than not, administrative decentralization claims far less attention than 
political and fiscal factors, with decentralization proceeding without explicit staffing 
strategies or public administration reform. Administrative devolution is inevitably drawn 
out, often falling behind political and fiscal decentralization. Political and fiscal 
devolution may have proceeded apace, but administrative changes may only approximate 
deconcentration (local service providers continue to be full employees of upper-tier 
government) or delegation (local government has only limited ability to hire and fire 
providers).  
Misalignment between the structure of the government bureaucracy and the 
assignment of service responsibilities to different tiers confuses incentives, weakens 
accountability for service delivery, and creates conflicts of interest instead of checks and 
balances. In many parts of the world—for example, India, Bangladesh, Malawi, and 
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Tanzania—administrative staff of sub-national governments are either directly appointed 
by an upper-tier government or belong to a national service and are on the payroll of the 
central government. In these cases, local staff continue to respond to the incentives 
provided by upper-tier governments. In Pakistan, the decentralization to local tiers has 
been incomplete with local staff still part of a provincial administrative cadre. Their 
incentive has been to claw back powers from the local level to the provincial one.  
The twin tasks of administrative devolution and building local capacity are 
closely linked, making the task of bringing this alignment about even more daunting. 
This leads to questions of sequencing between different aspects of decentralization and 
whether to wait to build local capacity before providing local governments the autonomy 
to respond to local needs, or to let local autonomy precede the creation of such capacity. 
There are no one-size-fits-all answers to these difficult questions, but there are some 
principles dealing with the role of the central government that are worth heeding in 
implementing decentralization. 
The central government has a key role in building local capacity and has two 
approaches available to it. It can provide training in traditional, top-down ways. Or it can 
create an enabling environment, using its finance and regulatory powers to help 
subnational governments define their needs (making the process demand-driven), to 
deploy training from multiple sources (local, national, overseas, public, private sector), to 
learn by doing as decentralization proceeds, and to establish learning networks among 
jurisdictions. This second approach is more consistent with devolution and more likely to 
produce capacity tailored to the many cross-sector responsibilities of subnational 
governments. It also avoids the pitfalls of a supply-driven approach. These sequencing 
issues are also addressed further in Section 4.  
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3.  Accountability of Local Governments to Local Citizens 
The hope of decentralization to locally elected governments is that by narrowing 
the jurisdiction served by a government, and the scope of public activities for which it is 
responsible, citizens will find it easier to hold government accountable. Roughly 
speaking, decentralization improves outcomes to the extent that physical proximity 
increases voter information, participation, and monitoring of performance, and to the 
extent that narrowing the scope of responsibilities of each tier of government decision 
makers reduces their ability to shirk on some responsibilities by performing better on 
others. But in order to fully analyze the question of whether locally elected governments 
have better incentives for service delivery we must begin with the question of why any 
level of democratic government in developing countries, where politicians presumably 
depend upon support from the majority of poor people, fail to provide the basic social 
services from which poor people benefit. Then we can attempt to understand why the 
incentives of locally elected governments might be different. 
It is a common observation across countries, rich and poor alike, that substantial 
public expenditures are systematically misallocated, for example to wage bills for bulky 
state administrations, to farm subsidies that impose distortionary costs on the economy 
and fail to benefit the poor, and to large infrastructure projects that allow political rent 
extraction without creating sustainable assets, all at the expense of quality public 
services. These misallocations have a disproportionate impact on the poor, who are 
known to benefit from increased access to public services. Even resources allocated to 
broad public services such as basic education and health might be ineffective in actually 
delivering those services, if, for example, the posts of teachers and doctors are used to 
extend the patronage of government jobs, rather than being held accountable for actual 
service delivery. 
Misallocation has persisted despite a sea change in the way in which governments 
are selected and remain in office. From 1990 to 2000, the number of countries governed 
by officials elected in competitive elections rose from 60 to 100.
4 Democratization might 
be expected to benefit most the “median” or average voter, who in most developing 
countries is “poor.” Yet, public policy in emerging democracies does not seem to have 
benefited poor voters. Why do policy-makers that depend upon political support from the 
poor not effectively deliver basic services to the poor?  
In recent political economy analysis (Keefer and Khemani 2005), it is argued that 
imperfections in political markets explain this puzzle. Political market failures in this 
analysis are reduced to three broad features of electoral competition—one, lack of 
information among voters about politician performance; two, social and ideological 
fragmentation among voters that leads to identity based voting and lower weight placed 
on the quality of public services; and three, lack of credibility of political promises to 
citizens. Informed voting is costly, and voters may have difficulty in coordinating 
information to reward (or punish) particular politicians or political parties for specific 
actions that improve (or worsen) the quality of public services. Similarly, socially and/or 
                                                 
4According to the number of countries reported in the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al, 2001) 
as having competitive elections for executive and legislative office (EIEC and LIEC equal to seven).    13 
ideologically fragmented societies are less able to provide the incentives to their political 
agents to improve broad public services, because voting is more likely to occur along the 
dimension of narrowly-defined identities. Even if voters are informed and coordinated in 
focusing on specific policies, if political competitors cannot make credible promises prior 
to elections, incumbents are more secure from challenge and have fewer incentives to be 
responsive to citizens. If politicians are credible only to a few voters, with whom they can 
maintain clientelist relations, then public resources are allocated to targeted benefits for 
these “clients”, instead of to broad public services.  
A strong conclusion of the analysis here, which is difficult for development 
policy, is that the most adverse effects of political market imperfections are felt in the 
area of broad public services, such as health and education. It is especially difficult for 
voters to assess the quality and efficiency of service provision in these areas and to 
evaluate the responsibility of specific political actors for service breakdowns or poor 
outcomes. By the same token, political competitors find it especially difficult to make 
credible promises about service provision. Voters cannot easily collect information that 
would verify that politicians have fulfilled their promises.  
Moreover, even if they could, politicians in many countries can only make 
credible promises to narrow groups of voters. For these voters, it may be politically more 
efficient to promise narrow targetable goods—such as a farm subsidy, a contract for an 
infrastructure project (especially if it doesn’t need to get built or if the contractor can get 
away with using poor quality materials), a government job as a teacher or a doctor 
(especially if they won’t be held accountable to show-up to work in schools and clinics). 
The large mass of unorganized voters would suffer from the resultant poor quality of 
services—bankrupt state utilities that bear the subsidy burden, dilapidated roads and 
undrinkable water, and empty schools and clinics where children don’t learn and the sick 
don’t get treated—but would find it difficult to coordinate action to improve political 
incentives. Social fragmentation in the electorate exacerbates these problems of voter 
coordination in determining reward and punishment based upon political actions towards 
the quality of public services.  
To the extent that in developing countries, poor voters are more likely to vote in 
uninformed ways, being susceptible to campaign slogans, or polarized along non-
economic, ideological dimensions such as religion or ethnic identity, and political 
promises are particularly lacking in credibility or prone to clientelism, it is precisely the 
broad public services that are likely to suffer. 
Within this framework of analysis, decentralization to locally elected 
governments will improve political incentives and service delivery outcomes if voters are 
better informed and likely to use information about local public goods in their voting 
decisions for electing local governments, if there is greater social homogeneity and 
coordination of preferences for local public goods, and if political promises are more 
credible at local levels. If political markets function better at more centralized levels of 
government, then decentralization might not need to be political, but rather designed to 
help central politicians with agency problems, such as gathering information, monitoring 
performance, and enforcing norms for locally produced and consumed services. That is, 
understanding the nature of political market imperfections can help to optimally design   14 
the institutions of decentralization, or analyze the impact of available and operational 
institutions.  
In the following three sections we consider each political market imperfection in 
turn, and whether these are likely to be more prevalent for centrally elected rather than 
locally elected governments. The general answer is, of course, that “it depends”, and the 
objective of the analysis is to begin to list on what this depends. 
3.1   Information, Participation, and Monitoring 
Voters may be better informed about the quality and availability of local public 
goods because of greater physical proximity, or more focused on using this information 
in voting decisions because of the narrower range of responsibilities for which to hold 
their representatives responsible. There are two ideas here, one that information is easier 
to come by at local levels, and that participation and monitoring by voters is less costly. 
The other is that if voters care about multiple issues a sub-set of which is decentralized to 
local levels, then they will be better able to hold each tier of government accountable for 
their respective responsibilities. For example, if voters care deeply about both education 
and national defense, national government decision makers can more easily remain in 
office by doing well on the latter and under-performing on the former. Decentralizing 
responsibility for education to a lower level government allows voters to hold one set of 
officials strictly accountable for education and the upper tier strictly accountable for 
defense.  
However, because of historically high degrees of centralization of resources , both 
public and private, there might not be regular or straightforward channels of information 
transmission at local levels. For example, information with regard to local policies may 
be of poorer quality if national newspapers, covering only national issues, are the main 
source of information for voters. Voters might be more apathetic to participation in local 
elections, perhaps because of poor media coverage and because they perceive that the 
bulk of the power and capacity to get things done reside with higher tiers of government. 
If local expenditures are financed entirely out of grants from higher tiers of governments 
and not out of local tax bases (as is the case in most developing countries), local voters 
may have little or no information regarding the resource envelope available to their local 
government and what those resources are intended to provide. 
There is very little data on political participation by households in developing 
countries so there is very little evidence on relative participation by citizens in local and 
national politics. Khemani (2001) finds evidence that Indian voters use more information 
in evaluating governments in state elections than they do in national elections. But, of 
course, states in India are large enough to be countries in their own right, so it is not clear 
how much this evidence tells us about real decentralization to local governments. 
Chhibber, Shastri, and Sisson (2003) surveyed voters in India and asked which tier of 
government they held responsible for the public goods they cared most about—medical 
facilities, drinking water, roads, education. The state governments were indicated as the 
most responsible agent by the majority of respondents, although locally elected village 
governments were also indicated as having significant responsibility for these public 
goods. This evidence suggests that the mere creation of locally elected governments does 
not ensure that citizens will hold local representatives responsible for public services.   15 
Azfar and others (2000) find that citizens in the Philippines and Uganda, both 
countries with recent decentralization reforms, rely on community leaders and local 
social networks for news about local corruption and local elections, and more on the 
formal media (TV, radio, newspapers) for news about national elections. However, there 
is no data about relative quality and range of information from these different sources.  
Evidence from Nigeria suggests that local governments’ overdependence on 
central transfers appears to have created uncertainty and lack of information about 
resources actually available to local governments, which facilitates local evasion of 
responsibility under the guise of fiscal powerlessness. What local governments do receive 
as transfers is therefore sometimes treated as the personal fief of local politicians 
(Khemani 2004a). 
3.2  Social Polarization and Elite Capture 
In socially polarized and/or ethnically fragmented societies, voters tend to vote for 
those candidates with whom they most closely identify. Political competition between 
parties thus also concentrates on identity issues, and candidates are nominated from 
constituencies largely on the basis of demographic calculations of ethnicity and religion. 
Like uninformed voters, polarized voters are therefore also less able to hold politicians 
accountable for their overall performance in office in making services work. Public good 
provision would suffer most under these conditions, since politicians in polarized 
societies rarely internalize the society-wide costs and benefits of their policy decisions. 
Decentralization might help by devolving decision-making authority to more 
homogeneous groups. However, social homogeneity may decline rather than increase at 
more local levels. Social polarization between any two local groups may be more intense 
due to age-old differences across settled communities, and weaker at the national level, 
perhaps through national campaigns of nation-building. Local politics may therefore be 
more likely to revolve around identity issues and hence not be geared towards providing 
strong incentives for political agents to deliver public goods.  
If some groups of voters, perhaps the local elite, are more likely to mobilize 
themselves to influence public policies at more local levels, then decentralization might 
increase the risk of “capture” of public resources for the benefit of the non-poor (Bardhan 
and Mookherjee 2000). For this expressed reason, the architects of the Constitution of 
India, a country with entrenched social and economic inequalities within communities, 
were reluctant to provide for formal institutions of local government (Mathew and Nayak 
1996). There is substantial anthropological and anecdotal evidence from India that 
disadvantaged groups are systematically excluded from using public goods within their 
own villages by social processes of discrimination. Micro-level case studies and survey 
evidence from India show that within-village inequality in education access and 
achievement is significant, with the privileged castes in the village enjoying near-
universal adult literacy for several decades while literacy rates are still close to zero 
among disadvantaged castes in the same village (Drèze and Sen 1996).  
Comparing across states in India it appears that local democracy and institutions 
of decentralization are more effective in states where land reforms and social movements 
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3.3   Credibility of Political Promises 
Political agents at appropriately decentralized levels may have greater credibility 
to voters at large because of their proximity, or reputation developed through community 
interactions over an extended period of time. However, these same features may allow 
clientelist promises to be easier to make and fulfill at more local levels due to closer 
social relations between the elected representatives and their clients, at the expense of 
broad public goods.  
Keefer (2002) shows that clientelism can be viewed as the natural outcome of 
political competition when the credibility of political competitors is limited. In these 
cases, political promises are credible only to “clients.” This has clear implications for 
public policy: the larger the number of clients, the greater the focus of government 
spending on items targeted to specific individuals (clients) and, ultimately, the less spent 
on public goods. Compared to a situation where no politicians are credible, clientelism 
generates less rent-seeking or corruption – but only because instead of keeping resources 
for themselves, patrons are obligated to transfer the fruits of office to clients. 
In an empirical application of his model, Keefer (2002) shows that as democracies 
age the impetus for clientelist policies first increases—as politicians are likely to increase 
their credibility first on a targeted basis by increasing the number of their clients—and 
then declines as broader reputations finally develop. Consistent with this argument, he 
finds that corruption and public investment spending (which is more targetable to 
particular constituencies) are both higher in younger than in older, well established 
democracies. According to this argument, recently instituted decentralized political 
competition might take some time to move from clientelistic policies to broad public 
services, as local political agents develop reputations for providing services to a larger 
group of the population. 
Greater social fragmentation among the electorate might make it more difficult 
for political agents to make promises about public service provision to large segments of 
voters, cutting across social divisions. Voters might only believe promises made by 
candidates belonging to their own ethnic or religious group; those promises are therefore, 
necessarily narrow, and targeted to members of the respective ethnic groups. A 
combination of relatively young democratic processes and social heterogeneity at 
disaggregated levels might therefore create conditions for local politics to be particularly 
clientelistic. There is some evidence for this, once again from India, from the experience 
of decentralization to village level governments. India has simultaneously instituted 
decentralization with political reservations for disadvantaged groups—women, and 
scheduled castes and tribes—in order to combat the problem of elite capture. Besley and 
others (2004) find that if the leadership of a locally elected village government in India is 
reserved for a scheduled caste or tribe member (SC/ST), then SC/ST households residing 
in the group of villages represented by that government are more likely to receive 
targeted welfare transfers.  
Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) find evidence that is consistent with greater 
capture and clientelism at local levels. They focus on 3 categories of public goods which 
together account for 73 percent of the activities of village governments in their sample in 
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governments are more likely to provide more of all three public goods, but the largest 
effect is for irrigation, as calculated at the sample average, which is the service most 
likely to benefit the rural elite. However, in villages with a very high proportion of 
landless (much above the sample average) public investment shifts from irrigation to road 
construction (rather than education, which is unaffected by proportion landless), which 
suggests that capture by elites can be ameliorated when the numerical strength of the poor 
increases, but in a manner that might not be the most efficient for extending benefits to 
the poor. Roads built by village governments primarily benefit the poor, but largely by 
raising their (short-term) wages, as local road construction and improvement initiatives in 
India serve as employment programs for the landless poor. Education, which one expects 
to have the most profound effect on poverty over the medium and long-term, seems least 
affected by decentralization. 
In a similar vein, in a study of villages in the states of West Bengal and Rajasthan, 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2003) find that villages with women leaders, elected as a 
consequence of mandated political reservations for women in village governing bodies, 
are more likely to invest in public goods that are revealed preferred by women during 
interviews—water, fuel and roads (as it provides employment) and less likely to invest in 
education. Their findings do not necessarily reflect the success of decentralization, per se, 
but rather of political reservations at any level of government in environments where 
there are substantial social pressures operating against the political participation of 
particular groups.  
Taken together, the work on political reservations and village decentralization in 
India suggests that traditionally disadvantaged groups that receive new democratic 
privileges tend to exert pressure to shift public resources out of education and into other 
targeted public goods that provide immediate benefit specifically to their group. While 
this suggests that political decentralization coupled with political reservations indeed 
succeeds in giving greater voice to these disadvantaged groups, it is also indicative of 
problems in the public provision of education services. Mandated reservations might 
worsen overall public service performance by strengthening clientelist relations and 
reducing incentives of political competitors to invest in broad policy reputations across 
the electorate.
5  
3.4   Political Parties and Electoral Rules 
A problem with large, centralized governments is that resources might be 
distributed across regions and groups with the purpose of winning only 50 percent of 
votes, or the required votes from only 50 percent of electoral districts (depending on the 
nature of electoral laws). Many regions with voters that are not the pivotal or “swing” 
voters can get systematically and pointedly neglected. Bolivia provides the most dramatic 
example of this. In 1994, Bolivia created 198 new municipalities where previously none 
                                                 
5 The shift away from education may be just a short-term effect of decentralization reforms. The immediate 
concern of new women political leaders, for example, may be to provide those essential public goods that 
disproportionately benefit women and have been historically underprovided. Demand for public resources 
in education may increase with time, as women are better situated to take advantage of improved 
opportunities. A full analysis of the dynamic impact of political decentralization in India, as the institutions 
stabilize over time, remains to be undertaken.   18 
existed, and increased the share of national tax revenues going to municipalities from 10 
to 20 percent. Before decentralization, about 93 percent of national resources was spent 
in the nine state or department capitals, while after decentralization this became 38 
percent, with a massive shift in resources flowing to the poorest and smallest 
municipalities (Faguet 2001). 
Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast (2001) find evidence for clientelist 
spending by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico to maintain its 
hegemonic control—non-supporting localities were denied public funds and public 
employment. They argue that decentralization reduced clientelism as opposition parties in 
states and municipalities began to publicly clamor for more transparent and egalitarian 
distribution of national resources. 
In general, Seabright (1996) shows theoretically that decentralization can promote 
accountability by increasing the probability that welfare of a given locality can determine 
the re-election of government. But decentralization could promote more clientelist 
spending because there is less electoral gain to be had from providing broad public goods 
to a larger group of voters. Electoral rules like proportional representation and district 
magnitude might be more significant determinants of the extent to which governments 
provide broad public services than institutions of decentralization (Persson and Tabellini 
2000).  
There is so far very little research into the nature of political institutions at local 
levels. How do political party systems interact with local electoral politics? One can think 
of several competing hypotheses. On the one hand, lower barriers to entry in local 
elections might intensify political competition, break party hegemony, and encourage 
challengers that are committed to reform. On the other hand, if political parties are the 
real decision-making bodies rather than individual politicians, it might be that the 
objective of local government leaders is something other than re-election at local levels 
(which is necessary for accountability to the local electorate). It might be that what 
political agents care about is rising through the party hierarchy or receiving benefits from 
party bosses. If this is the objective of locally elected governments, then their political 
incentives would be no different from the incentives of higher tiers of government. 
Policies at all levels of government would be determined by the nature of competition 
between rival political parties. We do not assert nor argue this, but merely point out that 
decentralization needs to be viewed in the context of broader political institutions that 
have large implications for service delivery. 
4.  Emerging Issues and Policy Implications 
Until now, this paper has discussed the implications of decentralization for service 
delivery as if decentralization were an outcome. But in reality, decentralization is a 
process, one that proceeds in fits and starts, occasionally with reversals. Furthermore, the 
way in which decentralization is carried out—the sequencing, the choice among different 
forms of decentralization, and how the politics is managed—can be just as important to 
service delivery as the decision to decentralize itself. This section explores issues 
associated with the process of decentralization. As there is much less known about the   19 
implications of these process issues for service delivery, the discussion is speculative, and 
suggestive of fertile ground for further research. 
4.1.   Sequencing Political, Fiscal, and Administrative Decentralization 
Ideally, sub-national governments should first be given clarity about their 
functions and associated expenditure responsibilities and based on these, the proper 
assignment and design of tax instruments and transfer systems should be done. The rule 
that finance follows function appropriately defines this sequencing. In addition, to ensure 
service delivery and the exercise of devolved powers in general, administrative 
decentralization should be implemented along with expenditure and fiscal arrangements. 
So function, finance, and functionaries all need to be sequenced properly. 
Once the expenditure, fiscal, and administrative bases are cemented, the rules 
about market access to finance should be clarified and sub-national borrowing permitted. 
Setting the expenditure and fiscal framework first before decentralizing borrowing 
powers is an important rule in the sequencing of decentralization. The expenditure and 
fiscal base provides the “collateral” to access capital markets: i.e. the fiscal base 
determines access to finance. In most cases, lack of access to financial markets is not a 
failure of capital markets but rather simply a failure to provide sub-national governments 
the appropriate fiscal resources that can be pledged in the capital markets as collateral. In 
addition, ensuring a proper fiscal base provides a safeguard against creating moral 
hazard: a policy that enables local governments to borrow in the market in absence of 
fiscal resources will inevitably signal capital markets that upper-tier governments are 
responsible for the financial liabilities of lower-tier governments. Similarly, the policy of 
setting up public financial institutions to overcome the lack of access to capital markets is 
a step in the wrong direction when the required intervention is on the fiscal side. Under 
these conditions, capital markets are unlikely to play their role of disciplining local 
government expenditures and management of services. And local service delivery can 
suffer. 
In reality, only on rare occasions do policy makers have carte blanche--the 
opportunity to sequence decentralization properly. In South Africa in 1994, the end of the 
apartheid era allowed the Mandela Government to introduce a new constitution and 
completely restructure the country’s intergovernmental system from scratch. Most 
countries however do not have such an opportunity to start anew; instead decentralization 
proceeds as and when there is a political opening. Not surprisingly, decentralization has 
often led to mismatches with, for example, devolution of expenditure responsibilities 
outstripping fiscal devolution (e.g., Eastern Europe), expenditure and (some) fiscal 
decentralization without administrative authority (Pakistan), design of fiscal transfers in 
the absence of taxing authority and lack of clarity in expenditure (South African 
provinces), and political decentralization – elections at the local level – without the fiscal 
authority (India and Bangladesh).  
These types of mismatches may result in poor service delivery outcomes, though 
it is not clear whether the outcomes would necessarily be better without decentralization. 
More importantly, the mismatches may well provide the political impetus for change. For 
example, the proliferation of centrally-sponsored development schemes in India with   20 
overlapping and contradictory objectives is now beginning to create a constituency for 
their consolidation and simplification. India may well see the shift from uncoordinated 
vertical schemes to consolidated, conditional grants that are tied to reforms and to a 
system eventually of unconditional block grants. Each shift can create the political 
opportunity for the next shift.    
In general, the policy reality that the design and implementation of 
decentralization is not always systematic suggests that decentralization is not a one-off 
policy change; it is an on-going process where the end point of accountable and efficient 
local governments may well take many decades to achieve. In this dynamic and uncertain 
process, ironically, it is the center that may be best positioned to manage the risks of 
improper sequencing and their impact. In addition, in such a dynamic process where 
decentralization processes across countries have different entry points with different 
mismatches, it is difficult to objectively measure decentralization and its impact. This 
may account for the dearth of empirical studies on the outcomes of decentralization and it 
calls into question cross-country econometric comparisons that draw conclusions based 
on common definitions and measurement of decentralization (Davoodi and Zou 1998). 
Much more needs to be done to assess the dynamics of decentralization to understand 
better the costs of inappropriate sequencing, the mismatches that really matter, how the 
mismatches may or may not provide further impetus to the decentralization process, and 
most importantly, whether and to what extent services succeed or fail during this dynamic 
process.  
4.2.   Different Forms of Decentralization: Functional versus Jurisdictional  
Various studies have suggested that efficient service delivery requires policy 
making, service provision, and regulation to be kept separate (World Bank 2003). The 
problem arises when the roles become blurred with policy makers taking on the role of 
providers and regulators or when providers are expected to fulfill regulatory functions. In 
these situations there are no checks and balances and accountability in service delivery 
diminishes. If separating the functions of policy making, service provision, and regulation 
within each sector is the key to better service delivery, why have we focused the 
discussion on the linkage between decentralization of responsibilities to lower tiers of 
government and service delivery? Would it not have been more logical to discuss how to 
create separation of functions? For example, it may not matter whether a water utility is 
owned by a central, state or local government, but whether the water utility has 
operational independence and autonomy regardless of the tier of government with which 
it is associated. In other words, the issue for service delivery may not be jurisdictional 
decentralization—separation of powers between tiers of government – but functional 
decentralization—separation of powers between government and service provider. 
There are several reasons why functional decentralization by itself does not allow 
us to address the problem of service delivery. To begin with, we face a political reality 
that service responsibilities have been devolved to lower-tier governments in many 
countries. In this context, “getting the rules right” about decentralization is essential to 
improving service delivery. In addition, services that require the implementation of user 
charges or allocation of subsidies– both being political acts – cannot be isolated from the 
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process i.e. functional decentralization cannot in reality be kept separate from the politics 
of subnational governments. In Cochabamba in Bolivia water supply was privatized and 
the formal private provider was given exclusive rights and allowed to implement user 
charges in an area dominated by local independent providers. Given the local politics of 
water this led to riots in the streets and the cancellation of the contract (Nickson and 
Vargas 2002). 
More importantly, jurisdictional decentralization may well be the political path 
for catalyzing functional decentralization. At one level, by devolving powers to sub-
national governments an upper-tier government can play an independent role in 
supporting incentives for lower tiers to reform their service delivery. In South Africa, for 
example, the central government has implemented a conditional grant aimed at providing 
incentives for reform of urban services for large cities after having devolved powers to 
city governments (Ahmad 1996). In the United States, given that municipalities have 
devolved authority over service delivery, state governments can credibly play the role of 
an independent regulator. In contrast, in Indian states, the fragmentation of 
responsibilities between states and municipalities has created a situation whereby policy 
makers at the state level have very little incentive to devolve powers to providers or local 
governments. Their incentive is to centralize, thus preserving their power base.  
In addition, during the process of devolution—the transition period between 
centralized to decentralized systems—upper-tier governments have the chance to enforce 
functional decentralization at the sub-national level. For example, in Pakistan the federal 
government has offered fiscal incentives to the provinces to restructure their education 
services. During an early stage of decentralization when sub-national governments may 
not have the requisite capacity and there are political incentives to show success in 
service delivery, such fiscal incentives can provide the incentives for sub-national 
governments to restructure their services in ways that separates policy making, provision 
and regulatory functions. 
4.3.   Decentralization to Community-based Organizations 
Decentralization of management authority down to the level of service providers 
and communities through the creation of community-based organizations with 
representation of service providers and users, such as education, health, water 
committees, is being explored as a promising approach to improving services. The hope 
is that it will institutionalize the participation of beneficiaries in the management of 
services and thereby improve performance. There are at least two problems with this 
decentralization strategy. The one that has received the most attention in the literature is 
that of “capture” of these organizations by local elite who would use them for their own 
benefit. If local communities have entrenched inequalities, such decentralization might 
facilitate elite domination of public services and systematic exclusion of disadvantaged 
groups. Baland and Platteau (1999) explore the role of inequality in the local 
management of resources. Mansuri and Rao (2003) provide a review of the empirical 
evidence on the functioning of community based and managed projects, distinguishing 
between the roles of elites as benevolent facilitators versus pernicious captors of 
resources. These studies indicate that while local community organizations would have 
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centralized governments to devolve project funding in a way that creates the right 
incentives for local agents to properly target benefits to the poor. 
The second set of problems derive directly from political incentives of governments. 
One is in implementation—if truly egalitarian community based organizations were 
successfully created and invested with the authority of managing service providers, rewarding 
them for good performance and punishing them for service breakdowns, politicians would 
have to give-up their claim on public employment as a form of political patronage. If 
politicians don’t give up this claim then local communities would have a hard time making 
service providers like teachers and doctors respond to their pressures—these providers may 
simply ask to be transferred out of the demanding communities, and refuse to take certain 
postings, because they know their jobs are politically protected. Poor people might indeed 
be well aware that providers are not doing their job, but feel powerless to change 
anything because teachers and doctors are elite members of the community, or people 
with political connections. Drèze and Gazdar (1996) recount how village schools in the 
state of Uttar Pradesh in India can be non-functional for as long as ten years due to 
teacher absenteeism and shirking, or used as a cattle-shed by the village head-man, 
without any collective protest being organized. 
In a multi-tier structure of government, the institution of decentralization to 
community based organizations might create opportunities for higher tier governments to 
use these groups to bypass democratically elected governments in middle and lower tiers, 
and target benefits to individuals or groups that are critical to win political power (not 
necessarily the poorest nor the most deserving). That is, it is difficult to get away from 
the impact of overall political incentives facing elected representatives at any tier of 
government.  
4.4.   Managing the Politics of Decentralization 
Even if decentralization is aimed at improving service delivery, it will be resisted 
by those who have benefited from the previously centralized system. For instance, 
politicians and bureaucrats at upper tiers of government may have been earning rents 
from the system that gave them control over the allocation of resources. These groups 
will resist decentralization if it threatens their access to such rents. This creates at least 
two dilemmas facing decentralizing societies.  
First, during the early phases of decentralization, as lower-tier governments adapt 
to their new responsibilities, the results in terms of service delivery may be disappointing. 
How can we distinguish between weak outcomes because of the transition and weak 
outcomes because of a fundamental flaw in the design of decentralization? In addition, 
decentralization opponents can use any early disappointing outcomes to build political 
momentum to slow down or even reverse decentralization. If the problem is one of 
transition, then how can these political forces be balanced by those who favor 
decentralization, even if they have little to show for it at the start? One obvious approach 
to managing the politics of decentralization is try to show early results on service 
delivery.  
This leads to a second dilemma. In order to show early results, it may be 
necessary to intervene and provide resources and technical assistance to lower-tier 
governments in ways that are different, and perhaps even inimical, to the long-run,   23 
sustainable success of decentralized service delivery. For instance, in Pakistan 
decentralization to districts is based on resources being transferred by the newly-
constituted Provincial Finance Commissions. Yet these commissions are only beginning 
to develop the award mechanisms for transferring resources in ways that will yield 
results. There are other ways of transferring resources that are likely to generate better 
outcomes in the short run, but these would involve going around the Provincial Finance 
Commission’s formulae and the philosophy of Pakistan’s decentralization. This is a 
classic dilemma in development, between short-term results and long-term institution-
building, and it is reflected particularly sharply in the process of decentralization. There 
is clearly no simple answer to this dilemma, except to reemphasize the principle of 
“strategic incrementalism”— reforms that are not likely to fully address service delivery 
difficulties but can alleviate acute problems while creating the conditions for deeper and 
more favorable change. This can be contrasted with, for lack of a better term, 
“incremental incrementalism” that merely solves one set of immediate problems but 
creates others, as might happen when donors continue to fund central, vertically-
organized development schemes to deal with the immediate service deficits but that 
crowd out local initiative or accountability.  
Another insight emerging from the framework of accountability presented in this 
chapter is that if the evolving institutions of decentralization address political market 
imperfections, even if accidentally, and not purposefully designed to do so, then they 
have enormous potential to eventually change the incentives of elected representatives to 
improve service delivery. In this view the progress in decentralization in any particular 
local context could be analyzed in terms of its impact on information and participation of 
citizens, and the credibility of political agents when making promises about improving 
broad public services, even if actual gains in service delivery are not immediately 
forthcoming. For example, even with incomplete decentralization of service delivery 
resources and responsibilities, if the creation of locally elected governments is 
instrumental in mobilizing poor citizens to participate in political processes and increase 
monitoring of government performance, then this might improve the incentives of higher 
tiers of government that retain control over service delivery. 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Dissatisfied with centralized approaches to delivering local public services, a 
large number of countries are decentralizing responsibility for these services to lower-
level, elected governments. The results have been mixed. This chapter has provided a 
framework for evaluating the benefits and costs, in terms of service delivery, of different 
approaches to decentralization. We highlighted the fact that service delivery depends on 
the relationships of accountability of different actors in the delivery chain. 
Decentralization introduces a new relationship of accountability—between national and 
local policymakers—while also altering existing relationships, such as that between 
citizens and elected politicians. Only by examining how these relationships change can 
we understand why decentralization can, and sometimes cannot, lead to better service 
delivery. In particular, the various instruments of decentralization—fiscal, administrative, 
regulatory, market, and financial—can affect the incentives facing service providers, 
even though they relate only to local policymakers. Likewise, and perhaps more   24 
significantly, the incentives facing local and national politicians can have a profound 
effect on the provision of local services. Finally, the process of implementing 
decentralization can be as important as the design of the system in influencing service 
delivery outcomes. 
Two of the more significant shifts in the 21
st century have been the increased 
attention to the delivery of public services on the one hand, and greater decentralization 
of responsibility for these services on the other. This chapter has attempted to identify the 
linkages between these two phenomena, emphasizing that the relationship is complex and 
far from being fully understood. Yet countries are taking decisions that affect the welfare 
of millions of people, many of them poor. The challenge to researchers is to provide the 
knowledge base so that these decisions will improve the welfare of these poor people. 
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